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1 Introduction 
 
Why do people pay taxes? This question has attracted increased attention in the tax 
compliance literature over the last few years. It can be supposed that nobody likes to pay 
taxes. One possibility is to “enforce” people to pay their taxes establishing a deterrence 
policy. In line with the economic-of-crime approach based on the expected utility 
maximisation calculus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model with the 
insight that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection 
and the degree of punishment. However, this pathbreaking model has been criticised by many 
authors (see, e.g., Graetz and Wilde 1985; Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1992; Frey and Feld 
2002). A main point, which is connected to the empirical and experimental findings, is that 
these deterrence models predict too much tax evasion. In many countries the level of 
deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. Furthermore, there is a big 
gap between the amount of risk aversion that is required to guarantee such a compliance and 
the effectively reported degree of risk aversion. For the United States, the estimated Arrow-
Pratt measure of risk aversion is between one and two, but only a value of 30 would explain 
the observed compliance rate (see Graetz and Wilde 1985, Alm, McClelland and Schulze 
1992). Similarly, in Switzerland the relative risk aversion varies between 1 and 2, but a value 
of 30.75 would be necessary to reach the observed level of tax compliance of 76.52 percent 
(see Frey and Feld 2002). Furthermore, tax compliance experiments mostly report a higher 
level of income declaration than the expected utility model would predict (for a survey see 
Torgler 2002).  
To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that tax 
morale
1 can help explaining the high degree of tax compliance (for empirical and 
                                                 
1 First important findings in the tax morale literature date from the 60s and 70s by German scholars around 
Günter Schmölders (1951/1952, 1960, 1962, 1970) known as the ‘Cologne school of tax psychology’. They have   3
experimental papers see, e.g., Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Lewis 1982; Roth, Scholz and 
Witte 1989; Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992, 1999; Pommerehne, Hart and Frey 1994; 
Frey 1997; Frey and Feld 2002; Feld and Tyran 2002; for a survey see Torgler 2001). Erard 
and Feinstein (1994) in their theoretical paper stress the relevance of integrating moral 
sentiments into the models to provide a reasonable explanation of actual compliance 
behaviour. Moreover, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) point out in their tax compliance 
survey that “adding moral and social dynamics to models of tax compliance is as yet a largely 
undeveloped area of research” (p. 852). Many researchers stress that a considerable portion of 
taxpayers are always honest. Some taxpayers are “simply predisposed not to evade” (Long 
and Swingen 1991, p. 130) and thus do not even search for ways to cheat at taxes (see Frey 
1999). More and more papers go beyond treating tax morale as a black box, a residuum, 
analysing which factors shape or maintain tax morale (for an overview see Torgler 2007). 
Also, there is an increased attention by policymakers to understand the driving forces of tax 
morale and the possibilities to influence the willingness to pay taxes.  
In the first part of the paper, we investigate using Swiss data whether there is a 
relationship between decentralizing the political competencies to those who are close to the 
problems and by giving them the final say and the willingness to comply. That means we 
evaluate if local autonomy are correlated with tax morale controlling for other factors. For 
this, the study investigates a cross-section of individuals throughout Switzerland using the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data set “Religion II”. The second part of the 
paper explores the same question but using the size of the shadow economy instead of tax 
morale as dependent variable. A relevant issue is whether influences obtained on tax morale 
are also reflected in real, or observed, behaviors. Thus, it may be interesting to complement an 
approach at the attitudinal level with a more output oriented variable, namely the shadow 
                                                                                                                                                         
emphasised that economic phenomena should not only be analysed from the traditional point of view. They saw 
tax morale as an attitude regarding tax (non-) compliance (see, e.g., Schmölders 1960).  
   4
economy. Moreover, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004) argue that the size of the 
underground economy can serve as a useful, if somewhat imperfect, measure of the extent of 
tax evasion. Thus, in the second part of the paper we will investigate to which extent local 
autonomy affects the size of the shadow economy using also Swiss data complemented the 
micro approach with a macro approach at the cantonal level. It is essential to analyze under 
which conditions it is more likely that citizens pay their taxes. Switzerland is chosen because 
it allows to observe the influence of institutional factors because cantons have different 
degrees of fiscal decentralization.  
Interestingly, the link between local autonomy and tax morale, tax compliance or the 
size of the shadow economy has been disregarded in the literature. Most of the papers using 
Swiss data focus on direct democracy. Estimating a cross section/time series multiple 
regression Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) found that in cantons with a high 
degree of direct political control tax evasion is – ceteris paribus – about SFr 1500 lower as 
compared to the average of the cantons without such direct influence. Feld and Frey (2002b) 
analysed how tax authorities treat taxpayers in Switzerland and found that tax authorities of 
cantons with more direct participation rights, compared to cantons with less direct democracy, 
treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers report too low incomes. 
On the other hand, not submitted tax declarations are more heavily fined. Looking at the 
experimental evidence, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1999); Feld and Tyran (2002); Torgler 
and Schaltegger (2005); and Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner (2003) found that voting on 
tax issues has a positive effect on tax compliance. The experiments were conducted in the 
United States, Latin America and Switzerland. Torgler (2005) also shows a positive effect of 
voting on tax morale using Swiss data. Tyler’s research (1990a, 1990b, 1997) also provides 
support for the importance of legitimacy and allegiance to authority in compliance decisions. 
Alm, Jackson and McKee (1993) analyze the effects of fiscal institutions on compliance by 
varying the process by which tax collection becomes a public good (voting versus   5
imposition). Donations given to a campus organization were taken as public good. So, the 
public good was not distributed directly to the subjects, but sent to a specific organization. 
The experimental results provide evidence that tax compliance is higher when individuals can 
vote on the use of their taxes than when there is no voting over alternatives. Individuals are 
more likely to comply with their taxes when they are able to select themselves the public 
sector expenditure program. On the other hand tax compliance is lower when subjects cannot 
control the use of their tax payments. Thus, the way people are treated by the authorities 
affects their evaluation of these authorities and their willingness to co-operate (see, e.g., Tyler, 
Casper and Fisher 1989). Working with the World Values Survey, Torgler and Schneider 
(2007a) also explore the relevance of culture in three multicultural European countries, 
namely Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. Other studies such as Torgler and Schneider (2007b) 
or Friedman et al. (2000) explore the importance of institutional quality at the international 
level. Torgler and Schneider (2007b), for example, using more than 25 proxies that measure 
governance and institutional quality they find strong support that its increase leads to a 
smaller shadow economy. However, they disregarded the analysis of decentralization and 
local autonomy.   
In Section 2 theoretical considerations are presented focusing on local autonomy. 
Section 3 and 4 present the empirical findings and Section 5 finishes with some concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2 Decentralisation 
 
The literature on fiscal federalism pioneered by Oates’ (1972) work on the advantages of a 
decentralized provision of publicly provided goods has discussed the pros and cons of 
decentralisation at length (for a survey, see Oates, 2008). In short, the main advantages of 
decentralization are seen in better tailored public goods to the needs of the voters (Oates,   6
1972), in endogenous restrictions to a Leviathan-behaving government (Lockwood, 2006) and 
in incentives for political innovations (Rose-Ackerman, 1980). Whereas disadvantages of 
decentralisation are seen in various kinds of distortions: namely urban externalities, fiscal 
externalities (vertically and horizontally) and local protection which may result in a race to the 
bottom with taxes and consequently an underprovision of public goods (see Oates, 1999 for a 
survey).  
Also in the case of tax policy, small structures have the advantage that citizens’ 
preferences can be met better than in a framework where a uniform tax system is designed for 
a population with heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, there is an intensive every-day 
interaction between taxpayers and local politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between 
taxpayers, the tax administration and the local government may induce trust and thus enhance 
tax morale. Politicians and members of the administration are better informed about the 
preferences of the local population. Furthermore, there is a politico-institutional aspect: if 
politicians are elected at the local level, they have an incentive to put preferences of their 
constituency into account and thus to spend the local tax revenues according to local 
preferences (see Frey and Eichenberger 1999). Decentralisation brings the government closer 
to the people. Many economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments 
the taxing power (see, e.g., Bahl 1999). One of the strengths of a decentralised system is a 
higher transparency between the tax price and the received public services. Taxes are 
comparable to prices in some sense, especially at the local level (Blankart, 2002). Even the 
(progressive) income tax is a good instrument for a local structure. It is always under 
individuals’ test, who have the opportunity to use the instruments of exit and voice (see 
Hirschman 1970). The mechanism of fiscally induced migration in federal states provides a 
strong incentive to provide public services in accordance to taxpayers’ preferences. Moreover 
federalism and local autonomy is combined with innovation. Federalism serves as a 
laboratory for policy inventions (Oates 1999). In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice,   7
Louis Brandeis in 1932: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” (Oates 1999, p. 1132). Feld and 
Schnellenbach (2004) have analysed different policy fields at the Swiss local level, where this 
kind of laboratory federalism in fact worked as a breeding ground for innovations. If voters 
can compare the performance of their government with the performance of neighbouring 
governments with similar conditions, there is also some kind of yardstick competition.
2 Thus, 
this leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1:   The more extensive the local autonomy, the higher ceteris paribus tax 
morale and the lower the size of the shadow economy
3.  
 
 
3 Empirical results on tax morale 
 
3.1. Model 
In order to examine our hypotheses derived in section 2, the following estimation equation is 
postulated for tax morale
4: 
 
  i i i i i c c C i TR CTL Y T D DD LA TM ε β β β β β β β β + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
 
where TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale. The general question to assess the 
level of tax morale from the ISSP (year 1999) was: 
 
  Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her income in 
order to pay less income taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong, 4=seriously wrong). 
                                                 
2 The seminal contribution on yardstick competition stems from Besley and Case (1995). 
3 However, it should be noticed that in Switzerland local authorities administer the largest part of income 
taxpayers. The cantonal level, which is the focus in this paper, copes only a smaller share of taxpayers directly.   8
 
The measurement of tax morale is not free of bias. First, because the available data are based 
on self-reports in which subjects tend to overstate their degree of compliance (Andreoni, 
Erard, and Feinstein 1998), no objective or observable measure of tax morale is available. 
Moreover, Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing (1987) found strong differences between actual 
evasion assessed and evasion reported in survey responses. Nonetheless, because the way we 
define tax morale is less sensitive than asking whether a person has evaded taxes, we expect 
the degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, the dataset is based on wide-ranging surveys, 
which reduces the probability of respondent suspicion and the framing effects of other tax 
context questions. It can still be argued, however, that a taxpayer who has evaded in the past 
will tend to excuse this kind of behavior and report a higher tax morale in the survey.  
In general, the use of such a single question has the advantage of reducing problems of 
index construction complexity, especially as regards measurement procedure or low 
correlation between items. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that tax morale is a 
multidimensional concept that requires a multi-item measurement tool and the likelihood of a 
multi-item index being adversely affected by random errors will produce more reliable 
measures. However, several previous studies have found consistent results using single-item 
survey measurements and laboratory experiments (e.g., Cummings et al., 2009; Alm and 
Torgler 2006).  
Our key independent variable is local autonomy (LAc). Local autonomy is measured at 
the cantonal level (c) with an index developed by Ladner (1994) based on survey results 
where chief local administrators in 1865 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they 
perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale. (1= no autonomy, 10 = very high 
communal autonomy). 
The other independent variables are specified as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                         
4 See Appendix Table A1 and A2 for the description and the summary statistics of the variables.    9
 
1.  DDc: For the degree of direct democracy the six point scale index developed by 
Stutzer (1999) and applied, e.g., by Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002); Frey and Feld 
(2002); Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) has been used. The index reflects the extent of 
direct democratic participation (1= lowest and 6 highest degree of participation) at the 
cantonal level.
5 As indexes do not tell as much as a single instrument, we are going to 
measure the degree of direct democratic participation with a dummy on legislative 
referendum and degree of signature requirements for legislative initiatives. Previous 
papers have stressed that direct democracy has an impact on tax morale and enhances 
taxpayers’ sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey 2002a, Torgler 2005, Alm, Jackson and 
McKee 1993) 
2.  Ti: Individual tax rate and Yi: The individuals’ household income (see Appendix Table 
A1). These are common factors used in a tax compliance model (see Alm 1999, 
Torgler 2002, 2007).  
3.  TRi: measures in the ISSP data set the confidence in the courts and the legal system
6. 
In a general way, it can be argued that positive actions by the state are intended to 
increase taxpayers’ positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-
payment and thus compliant behaviour (e.g., Smith 1992; Smith and Stalans 1991). 
One may criticize that cantons with more local autonomy and direct democracy have 
better governments and therefore people are more willing to pay their taxes in a state 
work better. This would, for example, suggest that an improvement in tax morale is 
independent of whether a particular citizen has the possibility to vote. Thus, to isolate 
                                                 
5 The index includes the four legal instruments: the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution, the 
popular initiative to change the canton’s law, the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new law or 
changing of a law and the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. The index is 
based on the degree of restrictions in form of the necessary signatures to use an instrument, the time span to 
collect the signatures and the level of new expenditure which allows to use the financial referendum (for a 
detailed discussion see Stutzer, 1999).  
6 How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete confidence to 1=no confidence 
at all).   10
the relationship between institutions and tax morale it is important to control for 
institutional trust. Alternatively, one could also try to include a dummy for foreigner, 
as they are not involved in the voting process. Unfortunately, this information is not 
provided by the ISSP data set.   
4.  Di : measures deterrence focusing on the audit probability using as an approximation 
the number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) in each canton c and the penalty tax 
rate approximated by the standard legal fine as a multiple of the evaded tax amount (in 
percent)
 in a canton c. It is difficult to predict the effects of deterrence factors on tax 
morale. We are therefore including this variable sequentially in the specification. 
Deterrence imposed by the tax authority might crowd out taxpayers’ intrinsic 
motivation to pay their taxes and thus crowd out tax morale. On the other hand, 
deterrence factors might prevent taxpayers with a low tax morale exploiting the more 
honest taxpayers. Tax morale is therefore not expected to be crowded out if the honest 
taxpayers perceive the stricter policy to be directed against dishonest taxpayers. The 
economics-of-crime approach may be more reliable when focusing on the shadow 
economy. The model would predict that the extent of the shadow economy depends 
negatively on the probability of being caught and the size of punishment in case of 
being caught. 
5.  CTLi : further control variables (age, gender, education, marital and employment status 
and religiosity. As a robustness test we are also going to control for cultural 
differences. Such control variables have been used in the past report a positive 
correlation for age, gender, and religiosity, and being married, a negative for self-
employment and mixed results for the variable education (Torgler 2006, 2007).  
 
   
3.2. Results   11
We present weighted ordered probit models. Some groups might be over-sampled. A 
weighted variable helps to correct the samples and thus to reflect national distribution. The 
weighted ordered probit models help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent 
variable tax morale. As in the ordered probit estimation, the equation has a non-linear form; 
only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. Calculating the 
marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect a variable has on tax 
morale. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of taxpayers (or the probability 
of) belonging to a specific tax morale level, when the independent variable increases by one 
unit. In the weighted ordered probit estimation, only the marginal effects for the highest value 
“seriously wrong not to report all the income” (ISSP 1999) are shown
7.  
We report clustering-robust standard errors (or t-statistics) for all tax morale 
regressions as we combine data on tax morale at the individual level with institutional data at 
the cantonal level. If the random errors are correlated at the cantonal level, the standard errors 
of the coefficient on the institutional variables are underestimated. Moulton (1990) has shown 
that failing to take this correlation into account would lead to a serious downward bias in the 
estimated errors, resulting therefore in inflated t-statistics and perhaps spurious finding of 
statistical significance for the institutional variable. 
The results of 12 regressions are presented in Table 1 to 3. First we explore in Table 1 
only LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA) as an institutional variable, including in (2) T (tax rate), 
and in (3) TR (institutional trust). In a second step, we add in Table 2 DD (direct democracy) 
(4) and D, the two deterrence factors (5). In equation (6) we also test the robustness of model 
using an OLS instead of an ordered probit model. In this case we report beta or standardized 
regression coefficients to explore the relative importance of local autonomy. In Table 3 we 
conduct a further robustness test. We control for culture differences using a language dummy 
LATIN (French and Italian speaking individuals) while running all the previous 
                                                 
7 The obtained results remain also robust when run estimations with standard errors adjusted to clustering on   12
specifications. Torgler and Schneider (2007a) have shown the importance of controlling for 
culture differences within a country.  
As can be seen, there is a strong and positive correlation between LA and TM (tax 
morale). The coefficient is always statistically significant and the marginal effects indicate 
that an increase in the LA by one point raises the share of persons indicating the highest TM 
value by more than 3 percentage points. Thus, the results show that we cannot reject our main 
hypothesis. Specification (6) also shows the relative importance of LA. An increase of one 
standard deviation in LA leads to a 0.116 standard deviations increase in TM. Table 2 
indicates that the LA has one of the largest standardized coefficients.  
Looking at the other variable we also observe that DD matters. The coefficient is 
statistically significant with marginal effects close to 2 percentage points. Frey and Stutzer 
(2000) argue that direct democracy and local autonomy are interdependent. Direct democracy 
and federal structures foster each other because individuals are interested in a strong 
federalism. They are bearing the costs and benefits of governments’ activities, which help 
taxpayers to get a better identification. In general, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) point out 
that: “The more important regional and local jurisdictions are in the internal organization of a 
nation-state, the more important is the question of the proper decision-making procedures at 
the different government levels. The assignment of competencies to different government 
levels is linked to decision-making procedures” (p. 333)
8. However, to investigate whether the 
positive correlation between institutions and tax morale are largely driven by a higher 
institutional trust (TR), we add the variable in specifications (3) to (6) and (9) to (12) together 
into the same equations. The results also indicate that TR is relevant. An increase in the TR 
scale by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest TM scale by around 3 
percentage points. In advance we may have expected that adding the trust variable in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
cantons. 
8 The two variables are significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (r = 0.574). Thus, it is difficult to separate the 
effects of the two variables in one model.   13
specification would lead to a decrease of the institutional variable in case institutional trust 
acts as a mediator variable. However, as specification (3) shows we don’t observe a decrease 
in the marginal effect of LA once we include trust.  
The results also show that there is a positive correlation between CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE and TM. To the author’s knowledge only a limited amount of studies 
examine the correlation between religiosity and tax cheating (Tittle 1980; Grasmick et al. 
1991; Torgler 2006). All three studies indicate that religiosity is negatively correlated with the 
degree of rule breaking or in other words is positively related to tax compliance and tax 
morale. Our findings are therefore in line with these results. Looking at the variables FINE 
RATE, AUDIT PROBABILITY and T (INDIVIDUAL TAX RATE) we find that the basic 
tax evasion model does not perform in a satisfactory way when focusing on tax morale. 
Deterrence shows a negative relationship with the coefficients that are not statistically 
significant. Similarly, we observe a negative and insignificant relationship between the 
individual tax rate and tax morale and the same for the income variable. The negative sign is 
consistent with many empirical papers analysing the correlation between tax rates and tax 
evasion (see, e.g., Clotfelter 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1992)
9. Finally, looking at Table 3 we 
also observe that culture matters. French and Italian speaking individuals report a lower level 
of tax morale than German speaking individuals. Such a result is consistent with Alm and 
Torgler (2006) who report that Romanic countries have a higher tax immorality than most 
other northern European countries.   
 
4 Empirical results on the shadow economy 
The previous results provide strong support that local autonomy matters. In a next step 
we will see whether this relationship remain robust when focusing on the shadow economy 
                                                 
9 It should also be noticed that Feinstein (1991) does not find a positive correlation between tax rates and non-
compliance, trying to better separate the effects of marginal tax rates from those of income.   14
with macro (cantonal) data. We therefore take the opportunity to extend the investigation from 
the attitudinal level to a behavioural one. This is especially important since it allows a further 
robustness check and provides the chance to control for additional variables at the cantonal 
level. 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services 
that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons (Schneider 
2005b):  
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Hence, in this paper, we will not deal with typical underground economic activities, which are 
all illegal actions with the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug 
dealing, etc. We also do not include the informal household economy which consists of all 
household services and production.  
The size and development of the shadow economy of the 26 cantons for the years 
1990, 1995 and 2000 were calculated using the following three step procedure: In a first step 
from the aggregated values of the size and development of the Swiss (overall) shadow 
economy are calculated using the currency demand approach. A currency demand equation 
was estimated for Switzerland over the period 1955 up to 2002. The results at the OLS 
estimations (corrected for first order autocorrelation) are reported in the Appendix Table A3. 
In a second step from this currency demand equation the overall development of the Swiss 
shadow economy was calculated. This is done by keeping the tax variable at its lowest value 
undertaking a dynamic simulation that generates overall (aggregate) shadow economy values 
for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. In order to get the disaggregated (cantonal) value we use   15
in a third step a decomposition method. It takes into account the sector composition and its 
level of shadow economy (see also Appendix Table A3 and A4). The fundament of the 
methodology of such estimation procedures has been discussed in previous studies (see 
Schneider and Enste 2002, and Schneider 2005a,b)
10.  
 
4.1 Model 
 
To explore the relationship between local autonomy and the level of shadow economy, we 
propose the following baseline equation
11:  
:  
SHADOWit = α + β1 CTLit +β2 Cit +β3 DDit+ TDt + CDi + εit     (2) 
 
where i indexes the canton in the sample, SHADOWit denotes cantons’ size of the shadow 
economy as a percentage of the official GDP over the periods 1990, 1995 and 2000. Cit and 
DDit are our proxies for centralization and direct democracy. We use the previous index and 
calculate values for these three years. The previously used proxy for local autonomy cannot be 
used as it has only been collected once. Thus, we take an alternative proxy that measures 
cantonal degree of centralization, namely the share of cantonal public spending on cantonal 
and local spending. The regressions also contain several control variables CTLit. To control 
for time as well as cantonal invariant factors, we include fixed time, TDt, and fixed cantonal 
effects, CDi. It is important to control for time specific effects in the analysis as we observe 
                                                 
10 As has been extensively discussed such estimation methods have their weaknesses. The MIMIC procedure 
requires a clear differentiation between causes and indicators, which is not easy to achieve; the estimates are 
quite often not stable and if time series are used for the cause and indicator variables, they should be stationary. 
The currency demand approach requires domestic locals currency it excludes barter transactions, also the 
assumption of the same velocity of the money in the official and underground economy can be criticised, as well 
as missing variables (like tax morale, or other influences) as driving forces for the shadow economy. To 
summarize, all known estimation procedures for the size of the shadow economy have severe weaknesses; hence 
there is no best method and one has to live with an error of 15 to 20% of the size and development of the shadow 
economy.  
11 See Appendix Table A1 and A2 for the description and the summary statistics of the variables.  
   16
for both, the degree of fiscal centralization and the size of the shadow economy a secular 
upward trend (see Figures A1 to A5). Moreover, it also helps to address concerns regarding 
pseudo variation in the fiscal centralization variable that is caused by business cycle effects. εit 
denotes the error term. In order to fulfill the ceteris paribus conditions, we have to control for 
a number of other important factors. GDP growth is a proxy for the level of development and 
prosperity of a region. A higher level of development goes together with a greater capacity to 
pay and collect taxes, as well as a higher relative demand for income elastic public goods and 
services (Chelliah 1971; Bahl 1971). In general, we would expect a negative relation between 
the GDP growth and the level of the shadow economy. Demographic and labor characteristics 
such as population size or the labor force may also affect the shadow economy. The labor 
force variable measures the potential pool that has the best preconditions to work in the 
shadow economy. On the other hand, individuals with an occupation have less leisure time at 
their disposal. Thus, time acts as a restriction to being active in the shadow economy. 
Unemployed people have an incentive not to report their additional work hours as otherwise 
they would lose their financial support (Schneider and Enste 2002). Controlling for 
occupation is in line with the micro estimations. Moreover, a higher level of urbanization may 
further anonymity and thus reduce loyalty towards the state; this may lead to a higher level of 
shadow economy. As many sectors are city-based, it is expected that there the incentives to 
act in the underground economy are higher, especially when government activities and 
services are below individuals’ expectations and preferences. Moreover, we not only control 
for the overall population size but also in line with micro estimation we control for the 
demographic structure within a society (share of elderly and the share of pupils). In line with 
the micro estimations we also control for deterrence and education. As a proxy for education 
we use cantonal expenditures in education. This variable covers all publicly provided 
education spending for basic education, high-schools, professional formation and cantonal 
universities in Switzerland which accounts for approximately ¼ of all cantonal spendings.    17
We also consider the share of REGISTERED CANTONAL HOUSE PROPRIETORS 
on the cantonal population
12. The commitment made by house proprietors to their jurisdiction 
by voluntarily increasing their opportunity costs for the exit option to migrate to another 
jurisdiction may support the willingness to remain honest. On the other hand, house 
proprietors have a strong demand for those economic sectors that have the highest rates of 
illicit work. Schneider and Enste (2002) report that building, renovating, repairing provide the 
largest share of illicit work (44% of the total illicit work) in Germany. Such results are also 
applicable to Switzerland. Thus, home proprietors may have a stronger incentive to take 
advantage of such services which increases the shadow economy. Finally, we also control for 
transfer payments (TRANSFERS) between the federal level and the cantons according to the 
federal fiscal equalization scheme. The financial equalization scheme between the cantons and 
the federal level has the aim to provide equal opportunities and fair positions among the 
cantons with respect to the production of public goods and services. However, cantons 
receiving extensive transfer payments are possibly subject to the “flypaper effect” with 
incentives for increased government spending and thus in consequence are less financially 
healthy and independent. This may be an indicator of institutional weakness that may affect 
compliance, too. Remarkably, these imperfections were also reason why the financial 
equalization system had been under pressure due to the lack of transparency and adverse 
incentives that promoted centralization. Moreover, the lack of incentives of cantons to fulfil 
their responsibilities on their own has also been criticized (Schaltegger and Frey, 2003). The 
fiscal burden is expected to influence the shadow economy positively. It can be argued that a 
higher burden increases the attractiveness of behaving illegally. We expect a positive 
correlation between the fiscal burden and the size of shadow economy. However, using such a 
proxy has some limitations. It can be argued that it is not so much the statutory tax rates that 
are relevant in the decision to behave illegally, but rather their application, offering tax 
                                                 
12 For summary statistics see Appendix.    18
exceptions or concessions that affect individual decisions (Friedman et al. 2000). The authors 
couldn’t find evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates are associated with a larger 
unofficial economy. On the contrary, they find some evidence that higher direct tax rates are 
associated with a smaller shadow economy. Such results are also supported by Dreher and 
Schneider (2006). To get a further proxy for governance we consider also cantonal deficits. A 
larger deficit may indicate that the government a larger share of public goods which may lead 
that there is a lower incentive or higher moral costs to be active in the underground economy. 
On the other hand, larger deficits may induce fiscal changes in the future (e.g., increase in tax 
burden) that might be anticipated by the people which may lead to a counter effect.   
 
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the results reporting four regressions. We report beta  or  standardized 
regression coefficients to reveal the relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust 
standard errors in these estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard 
errors. In all the estimations the coefficient for centralization (C) is statistically significant 
with relatively large beta coefficients. Thus, higher level of centralization is positively 
correlated with an increase in the size of the shadow economy (SHADOW). Such a result 
supports our previous finding. In the second specification we add direct democracy (DD). In 
the following specifications we add sequentially the proxies for DETERRENCE
13 and the 
TAX BURDEN. Also the remaining two regressions show that previous results are valid. 
Centralization matters at the macro level focusing on the shadow economy and not tax morale. 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
13 We only consider the audit probability as fine rate is directly related to tax evasion and not the shadow 
economy.   
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Thus, we find that institutional conditions are connected to individuals’ attitudes and their 
behavior.    
Looking at the control variables we find a negative relationship between DD and 
SHADOW. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant
14. LABOR FORCE is 
negatively correlated with SHADOW. It seems that time acts as a restriction of being active in 
the shadow economy. Such a result is also supported when looking at the correlation between 
POPULATION>65 and SHADOW.  On the other hand, the UNEMPLOYMENT RATE does 
not matter at all. Surprisingly, the results also show a positive correlation between 
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES and SHADOW. As an interpretation, this may reflect the 
fact that with a rising government size, opportunities in the shadow economy are also rising, 
independent of the specific government task. The positive relationship between TRANSFERS 
and SHADOW points in the same direction. We also observe that a larger deficit due to larger 
spending in relation to revenues generation reduces the shadow economy. Moreover, an 
increase in the SHARE OF REGISTERED HOUSE PROPRIETORS is positively correlated 
with SHADOW, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. We also find the tendency 
that URBANIZATION AND GDP GROWTH to be positively correlated with SHADOW. 
However, both coefficients are not statistically significant. In addition, we were not able to 
find a positive correlation between the fiscal burden and the size of shadow economy. 
Admittedly, using the tax burden has some limitations. It can be argued that it is not so much 
the statutory tax rates that are relevant in the decision to behave illegally, but rather their 
application (Friedman et al., 2000). The authors couldn’t find evidence that higher direct or 
indirect tax rates are associated with a larger unofficial economy. On the contrary, they find 
some evidence that higher direct tax rates are associated with a smaller shadow economy. 
Such results are also supported by Dreher and Schneider (2006) and Torgler and Schneider 
(2007b). Finally, the strength of the time and cantonal specific effects were evaluated using   20
joint hypothesis tests. The F-statistics indicate that in both cases the hypothesis is rejected, 
meaning that time and cantonal specific effects play a significant role in the determination of 
the size of the shadow economy.  
What about the causality between local autonomy and tax morale or the shadow 
economy? In Switzerland people cannot only vote on aspects of the tax structure, but also on 
the institutional structure. It can be stated that values and attitudes, which may partly differ 
across cantons, determine the extent of institutional structure in the long run. Thus, the effect 
of the institutions may partly reflect values. Or in other words, do taxpayers with a higher tax 
morale choose stronger a local autonomy or direct democratic institutions? Moreover, a 
substantial increase of the shadow economy can lead to a significant decrease in tax revenues 
and therefore to a lower quantity and quality of public goods and services. In line with Frey 
(2001); and Frey and Stutzer (2000) it could be argued that institutions such local autonomy 
and direct democracy have a long tradition in Switzerland and are quite stable over time, 
which suggests that the causality runs from institutions to tax morale or the size of the shadow 
economy and not the other way round. Figures A2 to A7 report the changes of these 
institutions over time at the national and cantonal level. The cantonal values in Figures A4 
and A7 indicate relative stable values over time. However, the boxplot in Figure A5 shows 
that there is a certain variation within the cantons over time (see median values and quartiles) 
that provides enough information to be investigated as a suitable explanatory determinant. In 
addition, one should note that the decentralization variables often exhibit a pseudo-variation 
which is caused by the fact that the tax base of sub-national governments is affected 
differently by the business cycle than the tax base of the national government.
15 However, 
based on this analysis it is not possible to fully rule out the causality problem.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 The coefficient is statistically significant if we don’t control for year specific effects.  
15 We are grateful to the referee for providing us with the argument.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
In the last two decades the numbers of studies investigating the underground economy or tax 
compliance have strongly increased. Generating statistics and empirical results are insofar 
important as it allows having effective and efficient resource allocation decisions. A similar 
tendency is observable in other areas that investigate illegal activities (Schneider and Enste 
2000, 2002; and Schneider 2005a). Although there are more and more studies that investigate 
the causes of shadow economic activities, societies often attempt to control these activities 
through measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education (Schneider 
and Enste 2002). However, there are further instruments that merit more attention. In this 
aspect, it is highly relevant to investigate other variables such as local autonomy. Thus, the 
basic intention of this paper was to analyse the effects of a bottom-up approach to fight the 
shadow economy and to increase tax morale. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of 
federalism on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy, a factor that the literature has 
strongly neglected so far. We therefore provide evidence using Swiss data at the micro and 
macro (cantonal) level. The results indicate that local autonomy is highly relevant to 
understand why people cooperate with societies’ rules. Institutions that respect the preferences 
of the citizens will have more support by the people than a state that acts as a Leviathan, and 
thus a responsive government will enhance tax morale. Both instruments help spend taxes 
according to the citizens’ preferences, which increases the motivation to pay the taxes. A high 
level of local autonomy allows expressing one’s own preferences and enhances identification 
with a state’s institutions; this counteracts the inclination to be active in the shadow economy 
and increase the willingness to pay taxes. Identification reduces therefore free-rider problems. 
If citizens and authorities interact with a sense of collective responsibility thanks to the   22
institutional structures, the system may be better governed and the policies more effective, as 
accountability promotes effectiveness through its impact on government behaviour.  
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Table 1: Tax Morale and Local Autonomy 
ISSP 1999                            
weighted  ordered  probit                
Dependent variable: tax morale                   
   (1)     (2)      (3)   
Independent Variables  Coeff. 
z-
Stat.  Marg. Coeff. 
z-
Stat.  Marg. Coeff. 
z-
Stat.  Marg. 
a) Institutions                 
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA)  0.193***  2.79  0.056  0.187***  2.70  0.054  0.196***  2.74  0.057 
b) Tax Rate                 
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE 
(T)       -0.006 -0.24  -0.002  -0.005  -0.21  -0.001 
c) Demographic Factors (CTL)                 
AGE  30-49  -0.013 -0.12  -0.004  -0.014 -0.12  -0.004  0.065  0.51  0.019 
AGE 50-64  -0.004 -0.03  -0.001  -0.006 -0.05  -0.002  0.063  0.40  0.018 
AGE 65+  -0.029 -0.22  -0.008  -0.032 -0.24  -0.009  0.038  0.24  0.011 
WOMAN  0.078 0.89  0.023  0.078 0.89  0.022  0.077  0.79  0.022 
EDUCATION  0.036 1.58  0.010  0.037 1.58  0.011  0.034  1.49  0.010 
d) Marital Status (CTL)                 
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER  -0.042 -0.44  -0.012  -0.044 -0.45  -0.013  -0.066  -0.68  -0.019 
DIVORCED  -0.276 -1.45  -0.071  -0.278 -1.45  -0.072  -0.299  -1.52  -0.077 
SEPARATED  0.181 0.74  0.056  0.181 0.74  0.056  0.141  0.57  0.043 
WIDOWED  -0.101 -0.56  -0.028  -0.102 -0.57  -0.028  -0.092  -0.50  -0.026 
e) Economic Variables (Y)                 
INCOME  0.1e-04  0.87 0.3e-05 0.000  0.44 0.1e-04  0.2e-04  0.38  0.4e-04 
f) Employment Status (CTL)                 
PART TIME EMPLOYED  -0.167 -1.22  -0.046  -0.173 -1.22  -0.047  -0.155  -1.06  -0.043 
LESS THAN PART TIME  0.040 0.19  0.012  0.026 0.12  0.007  0.014  0.06  0.004 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.054 -0.16  -0.015  -0.068 -0.21  -0.019  0.011  0.03  0.003 
STUDENT  0.362** 2.16 0.116  0.342*  1.89 0.109  0.395**  2.53  0.128 
RETIRED  0.332***  2.61 0.104  0.317** 2.15 0.099  0.319**  2.20  0.100 
AT HOME  0.160 1.04  0.048  0.144 0.89  0.043  0.146  0.82  0.044 
SICK  0.254 1.24  0.080  0.240 1.39  0.075  0.196  1.27  0.061 
g) Religiosity                 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (CTL)  0.090*** 4.52  0.026  0.090*** 4.43  0.026  0.082***  3.89  0.024 
h) Trust                 
TRUST IN COURT AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM (TR)            0.096***  3.27  0.028 
Observations  1114     1114     1068     
Prob > chi2  0.000      0.000      0.000     
Pseduo R2  0.027     0.027     0.030     
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME 
EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score 
(4). Standard errors adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  
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Table 2: Robustness Tests 
ISSP 1999  weighted ordered probit  weighted ordered probit  OLS 
Dep. V.: tax morale       
   (4)    (5)   (6)   
Variable  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Beta  t-Stat. 
a) Institutions          
LOCAL 
AUTONOMY (LA) 
0.144** 2.05  0.042  0.142** 2.00  0.041  0.116** 2.20 
DIRECT 
DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS (DD) 
0.059**  2.02 0.017  0.061*  1.80 0.018  0.055*  1.77 
b) Tax Rate          
INDIVIDUAL INC. 
TAX RATE (T) 
-0.002 -0.11  -0.001 -0.002 -0.11  -0.001 -0.002 -0.15 
e) Demographic 
Factors (CTL) 
        
AGE  30-49  0.066 0.52  0.019 0.066 0.52  0.019 0.042 0.42 
AGE 50-64  0.062 0.39  0.018 0.061 0.39  0.018 0.048 0.43 
AGE 65+  0.024 0.15  0.007 0.024 0.15  0.007 0.045 0.28 
WOMAN  0.080 0.83  0.023 0.080 0.83  0.023 0.062 0.87 
EDUCATION  0.037 1.60  0.011 0.037 1.59  0.011 0.030 1.64 
f) Marital Status 
(CTL) 
        
MARRIED/LIVING 
TOGETHER 
-0.066 -0.67  -0.019 -0.065 -0.65  -0.019 -0.059 -0.76 
DIVORCED  -0.297 -1.53  -0.076 -0.297 -1.54  -0.076 -0.259*  -1.88 
SEPARATED  0.149 0.61  0.045 0.150 0.63  0.046 0.084 0.37 
WIDOWED  -0.101 -0.56  -0.028 -0.100 -0.55  -0.028 -0.086 -0.59 
g) Economic 
Variables (Y) 
        
INCOME  0.1e-04 0.29  0.3e-05 0.1e-04 0.29  0.3e-05 0.1e-04 0.45 
h) Employment 
Status (CTL) 
        
PART TIME 
EMPLOYED 
-0.151 -1.03  -0.042 -0.151 -1.04  -0.042 -0.111 -1.05 
LESS THAN PART 
TIME 
0.018 0.08  0.005 0.017 0.07  0.005 0.027 0.18 
UNEMPLOYED  0.023 0.07  0.007 0.023 0.07  0.007 0.054 0.22 
STUDENT  0.403*** 2.60  0.131  0.404*** 2.66  0.131  0.316**  2.09 
RETIRED  0.339** 2.27  0.107  0.339** 2.27  0.107  0.272*  1.77 
AT HOME  0.158 0.88  0.048 0.158 0.88  0.048 0.138 1.02 
SICK  0.228 1.58  0.071 0.227 1.59  0.071 0.220 0.97 
i) Religiosity          
CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE (CTL) 
0.083*** 3.95  0.024  0.083*** 3.95  0.024  0.064*** 4.18 
d) Trust           
TRUST IN COURT 
AND LEGAL  
0.093*** 3.22  0.027  0.093*** 3.23  0.027  0.080**  2.29 
SYSTEM (TR)           
a) Deterrence 
Factors (D) 
        
AUDIT 
PROBABILITY  
   -0.3e-04  -0.04  -0.1e-04  0.1e-04  0.01 
FINE  RATE    -0.1e-03  -0.10  -0.3e-04 -0.1e-04 -0.01 
Observations  1068     1068    1068   
Prob > chi2 or Prob > 
F 
0.000     0.000     0.000  
(Pseudo) R2  0.031     0.031     0.077  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 
FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (4). OLS estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Standard errors adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons.    28
Table 3: Tax Morale and Culture 
 Ordered  Probit  OLS 
  1a  2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 
LA  0.118*  0.116* 0.129* 0.127* 0.126* 0.102* 
  1.72  1.73 1.79 1.88 1.85 1.91 
  0.034  0.033 0.037 0.037 0.036  
         
LANGUAGE (LATIN)  -0.215**  -0.199*  -0.199*  -0.186 -0.192 0.673* 
  -2.13  -1.87 -1.87 -1.05 -1.06 1.92 
  -0.060  -0.056 -0.056 -0.052 -0.053  
         
T  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
         
TR  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES 
         
DD  NO  NO NO YES  YES  YES 
         
D  NO  NO NO NO YES  YES 
         
CTL  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations  1114  1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 
Prob > chi2 or Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(Pseudo) R2  0.029  0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.079 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, 
SINGLE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (4). z-statistics and t-statistics in italics, marginal effects in bold. OLS 
estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Standard errors adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  
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Table 4 Impact of Centralization on the Size of the Shadow Economy 
 
Beta  Beta Beta Beta  Dep. variable: shadow economy  
(7) 
t-stat.  
(8) 
t-stat.  
(9) 
t-stat.  
(10) 
t-stat.  
CENTRALIZATION    (C)  0.368** 2.12 0.365** 2.09  0.314*  1.82 0.304*  1.71 
               
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (DD)     -0.155 -1.08  -0.154 -1.05  -0.121 -0.71 
              
GDP  GROWTH  0.058 1.20  0.067 1.29  0.067 1.37  0.061 1.19 
              
TRANSFERS    -0.101 -1.47  -0.084 -1.20  -0.081 -1.22  -0.079 -1.19 
              
DEFICITS  -0.246*** -4.55  -0.233*** -4.47  -0.222*** -4.35  -0.223*** -4.32 
              
EDUCATION  EXPENDITURES  0.261** 2.13 0.267** 2.13  0.235** 2.16 0.226** 2.06 
              
LABOR  FORCE  -0.134* -1.88  -0.161* -1.92  -0.182* -1.93  -0.172* -1.71 
              
-0.002  -0.04  0.008 0.11  0.025 0.36  0.014 0.19  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
           
0.407 0.70  0.492 0.80  0.537 0.80  0.437 0.62  URBANIZATION 
           
POPULATION  SIZE  -6.456** -2.54 -6.470** -2.54  -6.037** -2.68 -6.137** -2.65 
              
POPULATION    <15  0.432** 2.67 0.442** 2.70  0.410***  2.89 0.356** 2.12 
              
POPULATION    >65  0.255** 2.70 0.253** 2.62  0.248** 2.39 0.263** 2.43 
              
SHARE OF REGISTERED   -0.473 -0.98  -0.473 -0.99  -0.433 -0.95  -0.576 -0.98 
HOUSE PROPRIETORS              
               
DETERRENCE        0.100  0.92  0.080  0.67 
               
TAX  BURDEN           0.063  0.65 
State (Canton) Effects  Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes    
Year  Effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
F-Test  Cantons  19.59***   21.70***   19.17***   16.03***  
F-Test  Year  19.69***   17.76***   20.33***   15.06***  
Prob  >  F  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Observations  78   78   78   78  
R-squared  0.981     0.981     0.982    0.982    
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table A1 Derivation of variables ISSP 
Variable Derivation 
TAX MORALE (TM, DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE) 
Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or 
her income in order to pay less income taxes? (1. not wrong, 2. a bit wrong, 3. 
wrong, 4. seriously wrong). 
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA)  Local autonomy is measured at the cantonal level (c) with an index developed 
by Ladner (1994) based on survey results where chief local administrators in 
1865 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local 
autonomy on a 10 point scale. (1= no autonomy, 10 = very high communal 
autonomy). 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (DD)  Index of direct democracy, own calculation based on Stutzer (1999). 
TRUST IN COURT AN THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM (TR) 
How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete 
confidence to 1=no confidence at all) 
FINE RATE (D)  Standard legal fine (in percent) as a multiple of the evaded tax amount based on 
questionnaire data of Frey and Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (D)  Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) based on questionnaire data of Frey 
and Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
INDIVIDUAL TAX RATE (T)  Own calculations based on the average weighted value (in percentage) working 
with the income information done by the ISSP. From the tax table 
(Steuerbelastung in der Schweiz 1999, p. 48) the value closest to the ISSP 
income values (midpoint) is used. For simplicity, no differentiation between 
singles and married people has been made, working with the individual tax rate 
table for singles.  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (CTL)  How often do you take part in the activities or organisations of a church or a place of 
worship, other than attending services? Never (1), less than once a year, about once or 
twice a year, several times a year, about once a month, 2-3 times a month, nearly every 
week, every week, several times a week (9) 
INCOME (Y)  Monthly earnings from employment in Swiss francs (midpoints) 
EDUCATION (CTL)  What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
1.  Incomplete primary school 
2.  Primary school (up to 12 years of age) 
3.  Incomplete secondary 
4.  Secondary completed 
5.  Incomplete + complete semi-higher qualification, incomplete 
university, others 
6.  University completed 
LATIN  French and Italian speakers. 
Source: ISSP (1998) 
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Table A2 Summary statistics micro   
Variables Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
TAX MORALE (TM)  1143  1.767  0.917  0  3 
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA)  1204  4.737  0.662  3.2  6.1 
DIRECT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (DD)  1204  3.599 1.203 1.75  5.69 
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE (T)  1204  5.890  6.234  0  25.14 
AGE  30-49  1204  0.450 0.498 0  1 
AGE 50-64  1204  0.241 0.428 0  1 
AGE 65+  1204  0.123 0.328 0  1 
WOMAN  1204  0.534 0.499 0  1 
EDUCATION  1201  3.657 1.681 1  7 
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER  1196  0.535 0.499 0  1 
DIVORCED  1196  0.058 0.233 0  1 
SEPARATED  1196  0.023 0.151 0  1 
WIDOWED  1196  0.053 0.223 0  1 
INCOME  1204  2911.296 3445.100 0  22500 
PART TIME EMPLOYED  1201  0.143 0.350 0  1 
LESS THAN PART TIME  1201  0.068 0.252 0  1 
UNEMPLOYED  1201  0.014 0.118 0  1 
STUDENT  1201  0.072 0.258 0  1 
RETIRED  1201  0.142 0.350 0  1 
AT HOME  1201  0.087 0.283 0  1 
SICK  1201  0.009 0.095 0  1 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE   1188  2.582 1.825 1  9 
TRUST IN COURT AND LEGAL SYSTEM (TR)  1146  3.119  0.906  1  5 
AUDIT PROBABILITY (D)  1204  53.006  36.141  7.05  188.98 
FINE  RATE  (D)  1204  78.241 33.292 30  200 
LATIN  1204  0.375 0.484 0  1 
Note: 38% of the individuals stated that they have no own income or no paid work. Excluding this group leads to 
a mean in the individual tax rate of  9.8 percent.  
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 Table A3 Currency demand equation 
log (currency outside banks/M2)t =   -3.501   absolute term 
 (-0.147)   
    
 +0.334 
   (1.46)  
log (real GDP)t 
    
 +0.009   
   (1.49) 
wage quota (percent of the wage 
sum to total income)t 
    
   -0.034*  
 (-2.24) 
(interest rate on government 
bonds)t  
    
 +0.022*   
   (2.43) 
burden of direct and indirect 
taxation (total taxes in percent of 
GDP)t  
    
 +0.884**   
 (+3.88) 
log (currency outside banks/M2)t-1 
R² = 0.97     
F = 188.9     
h = 1.43     
Rho = 0.97     
d.f. = 44     
Note: t-statistics parentheses     
 
 
Table A4 Swiss shadow economy in the he following five sectors:  
(1) construction, craftsmanship including repairing   36% 
(2) Other craftsmanship and industrial firms (cars, machinery …)   17% 
(3) The whole service sector in hotels, restaurants, also catering, etc.   18% 
(4) Entertainment sector, prostitution, gambling, etc.   14% 
(5) Other craftsmanship and all household services, cleaning, gardening, ironing, babysitting, etc.   15% 
Notes: These values are for the year 2006 and are taken from Schneider, Torgler and Schaltegger (2008).  
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Table A5 Descriptive statistics for macro analysis 
Variable name  Description  Source 
SHADOW ECONOMY  Size of the shadow economy per capita ( in 
Mio CHF deflated to the year 1990) 
Own calculations (see Appendix) 
GOVERNMENT  
CENTRALIZATION 
Share of cantonal public spending on cantonal 
and local spending 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY  Index of direct democracy  Own calculation based on Stutzer (1999) 
GDP GROWTH  Logarithm of real cantonal GDP growth per 
capita 
Own calculation based on BAK Basel 
Economics 
EDUCATION 
EXPENDITURES 
publicly provided cantonal education spending 
(logarithmized in the estimations)  
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
TRANSFERS  Transfer payments between the federal level 
and the cantons according to the federal fiscal 
equalization scheme (logarithmized in the 
estimations) 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
DEFICIT  Real public revenues – real public spending) 
per capita (GDP-deflator for 1980 = 1)   
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
LABOR FORCE  Share of employment on the cantonal 
population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE 
Share of unemployment on the cantonal 
population 
Own calculations on the basis of Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 
URBANIZATION Proportion  of  local communities having more 
than 10'000 inhabitants.  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION SIZE  Cantonal population size (logarithmized in the 
estimations).  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION  <15  Share of cantonal population over age 65 on 
total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION  >65  Share of cantonal population under age 15 on 
total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
SHARE OF 
REGISTERED HOUSE 
PROPRIETORS 
Share of registered house proprietors  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
DETERRENCE   Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰)   Based on questionnaire data of Frey and 
Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 
2002b) 
TAX BURDEN  Cantonal tax burden   Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
 
Table A6 Summary statistics macro 
VARIABLES Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
SHADOW  ECONOMY  78  0.004 0.002  0.002 0.012 
GOVERNMENT  CENTRALIZATION  78  0.680 0.102  0.526 0.978 
DIRECT  DEMOCRACY  78  4.256 1.200  1.583 5.833 
GDP GROWTH  78  0.008  0.010  -0.020  0.024 
EDUCATION  EXPENDITURES  78  2.449 0.157  2.169 2.874 
TRANSFERS  78  3.176 0.076  3.051 3.458 
DEFICIT 78  23.300  242.190  -668.882  710.058 
LABOR  FORCE  78  0.502 0.027  0.439 0.564 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  78  1.879 1.800  0.000 7.000 
URBANIZATION  78  0.324 0.250  0.000 0.994 
POPULATION SIZE  78  269450  279041  13573  1211647 
POPULATION  <15  78  0.183  0.022  0.116  0.232 
POPULATION  >65  78  0.148  0.020  0.108  0.209 
SHARE OF REGISTERED HOUSE PROPRIETORS  78  0.412 0.111  0.127 0.612 
DETERRENCE   78  63.188  41.433  3.139  188.98 
TAX BURDEN  78  102.606  19.264  55.80  154.10   34
Figure A1 Size of the Shadow Economy at the Cantonal Level in Mio CHF (deflated to the year 1990) 
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Figure A2 Shadow economy over time in Switzerland, Germany and Austria 
 
 
Figure A3: Government centralization over time (share of state spendings on state and local 
spendings) over 26 cantons 
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Figure A4: Government centralization at the cantonal level of over time 
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Figure A5: Boxplot Reporting the Variation Between 1981 and 2001  
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Figure A6 Development of direct democracy over time in Switzerland (Frey-Stutzer-Index) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7 Degree of Direct Democracy Between 1970 and 1998 at the Cantonal Level 
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Notes: The cantons, which have or had until recently the ‘Landsgemeinde’ (town meeting) (Appenzell I. Rh., 
Obwalden, Glarus, Appenzell A. Rh. and Nidwalden), have not been included in these estimations. 